On Black Friday, the Destiny USA Shopping Mall in Syracuse,
New York was evacuated
after a shooting in the food court. The following day, a knife fight broke out
in the mall’s entertainment
complex, adding to shoppers’ apprehension
about visiting. This apprehension should be shared by holders of Commercial
Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS) collateralized solely by Destiny USA loans,
including owners of $215 million in AAA-rated senior notes. While one
short-lived catastrophic event will not lead directly to bond defaults, the
outbreaks of violence at an already troubled mega-mall cast a harsh light on
rating agency decisions to assign their highest grades to structured notes
wholly lacking the protection afforded by diversification.
As Marc reported
previously, rating agencies have repeatedly assigned top ratings to CMBS
secured by mortgages on only a single shopping mall. These shopping mall deals
are a subcategory of so-called Single Asset / Single Borrower (SASB) CMBS.
Buyers of AAA-rated SASB securities are protected from adverse performance only
by overcollateralization – the fact that subordinated bonds will take the first
hit when underlying loans fail to pay interest and principal in full and on
time.
In the case of the Destiny Mall deal, JPCMM 2014-DSTY, the S&P
and KBRA
AAA-rated tranche accounts for half of the $430 million deal (excluding
interest only securities). A credit event that forces a write-down of the
underlying mortgages by more than 50% will trigger losses on the AAA notes.
While unlikely, such an event is hardly unimaginable,
especially given the large number of dead malls dotting the
American landscape. Isolated shooting and stabbing incidents – even at the
height of the shopping season – probably won’t deliver a large blow to Destiny
USA, but if the mall gains a reputation for danger, shoppers will inevitably
begin to avoid it. In a weak environment for brick and mortar retail, reduced
foot traffic could trigger store closures, leading to a downward spiral of fewer
retailers and fewer shoppers.
Without diversification, the senior CMBS notes are
vulnerable to default under these circumstances. Facing such a highly plausible
default scenario, the senior notes do not justify a rating of AAA – an
ultra-safe category for which default should be virtually unimaginable. S&P,
for example, claims it expects AAA bonds to have a default probability of 0.15%
over any 5-year period.
Why would any rating agency believe a single property, even
with multiple businesses on this single property, should have such certainty that
a loss of greater than 50% of asset value is virtually impossible? KBRA, for
example, acknowledges the low diversity of SASB CMBS but asserts implicitly
that its
stress assumptions for net cash flow and capitalization rate are sufficient
nonetheless. Yet the stresses at the AAA
level apparently do not permit the model to reach 50% loss. Et voila, it’s
possible to reach the AAA rating with 50% or lower LTV.
While S&P and KBRA maintain AAA ratings on Destiny USA
mall bonds, two other rating agencies take a more critical view of the
facility. Both Moody’s and Fitch rate municipal bonds
supported by mall revenues. In June, Moody’s downgraded
these securities to Ba2 – a speculative rating – citing Destiny’s challenging
operating environment. Fitch also downgraded
the bonds to BBB concluding that “a recent trend of weaker performance … is
likely to reduce the mall's value.”
The top ratings from S&P and KBRA are even harder to comprehend
since the CMBS are subordinated to the municipal bonds to which Moody’s and
Fitch assign the much lower ratings of Ba2 and BBB, respectively. These
municipals are secured by “Payments In Lieu of Taxes” (PILOT) from the mall. According
to the Official
Statement for these PILOT bonds: “The 2014 CMBS Mortgage securing the 2014
CMBS Loan is subordinate to the PILOT Mortgages securing the PILOT Bonds (Page
4).”
AAA ratings for CMBS bonds that are subordinate to Ba2/BBB
municipal securities are very hard to fathom. The distinction of CMBS versus
municipal bonds is irrelevant since Dodd Frank’s
Universal Rating Symbols mandate requires that rating agencies maintain
equivalent meaning of rating symbols across different asset classes.
A dozen years after the financial crisis, rating agencies
remain a weak
link in the financial system. We don’t know when the next financial storm
will occur or what it might look like, but overrated commercial mortgages are
clearly a vulnerability. Before the clouds start gathering, rating agencies
should take a harder, more skeptical look at deals collateralized by shopping
malls and those collateralized by pools lacking in diversity.
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This piece was written by Marc Joffe and Joe Pimbley, who both consult for PF2. Marc Joffe is a Senior Policy Analyst at the Reason Foundation. Joe Pimbley is the Editor of the Journal of Derivatives.
This piece was written by Marc Joffe and Joe Pimbley, who both consult for PF2. Marc Joffe is a Senior Policy Analyst at the Reason Foundation. Joe Pimbley is the Editor of the Journal of Derivatives.