Showing posts with label RMBS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label RMBS. Show all posts

Monday, March 16, 2020

Investor Protections (of a Legal Variety) in the Aftermath of a Meltdown

In a recent journal article available here, mortgage guru Mark Adelson has compiled another of his terrific analyses of the mortgage meltdown, and some of the letdowns of post-crisis legislation.
You have to read the piece in its entirety, but here are just some of his analytical gems and opinions to give you a flavor for what’s inside:
  • “The mortgage meltdown produced $1 trillion (±20%) of losses from 2007 through 2016. The losses were borne primarily by investors in non-agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS).”
  • “Investors around the world invest in the US markets because they have integrity and there are multiple checks in place to ensure that misrepresentations are remedied.”
  • “Nonetheless, the Mortgage Meltdown of the late 2000s left many investors reeling. They suffered huge losses on non-agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued from roughly 2005 through 2007. Those losses came from a wave of defaults and foreclosures on mortgage loans originated during those years. During that time, there was a broad deterioration of practices across the mortgage lending and securitization industry.”
  • “The full extent of the breakdown in practices started to come to light in 2013, when the US Department of Justice (DOJ) began settling lawsuits against the major banks.”
  • “Common types of defects included (i) defective appraisals that overstated the value of homes, (ii) exceptions allowed without sufficient compensating factors, (iii) missing or inaccurate documentation of borrower income or assets, and (iv) misstated occupancy status. When the loans were included in MBS deals, the offering materials did not disclose the defects.”
  • “By the time this mounting evidence came to light, it was too late for most investors to sue under the federal securities laws to recover their losses.”
  • “The legislative response to the mortgage meltdown and the broader financial crisis did not address the time limits issue. The time limit under the 1933 Act remains a critical piece of unfinished business. If it is not addressed, America’s capital markets will remain vulnerable to a repeat of the mortgage meltdown experience. We propose extending the 1933 Act’s maximum time limit to 12 years for actions based on misstatements or omissions in connection with the sale of non-agency MBS (i.e., actions under 1933 Act §§ 11 and 12(a)(2)).”
  • “Issuance of non-agency MBS fell off sharply following the mortgage meltdown. […] Attempts to revive the non-agency MBS market have been unsuccessful.”
  • “The aftermath of the mortgage meltdown offers potential lessons for lawyers, business professionals, and policy makers. The episode was arguably the largest failure of legal protections for investors since the Great Depression. Investors have recovered only a small percentage of their total losses.”

That’s just a taste – for more, download the paper by clicking here.

Thursday, April 14, 2016

Goldies Sampling, and the Silver Settlement

This week has brought with it some significant disclosure on some of the forms of pre-crisis misconduct at the banks, and the first settlement of post-crisis alleged manipulation of the silver markets.

Allegations into silver and gold markets manipulation are among a string of claims made against the big banks for post-crisis benchmark manipulation -- the other well-known cases being the three exchange rate and interest rate manipulation allegations: LIBOR, FX, and ISDAFIX, the last of which survived a motion to dismiss, just two weeks ago.

Deutsche Bank has settled with the class In re: London Silver Fixing Ltd., Antitrust Litigation, 1:14-md-02573, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan), but those terms have not been disclosed.

Statistical Sampling Techniques ... Gone Wrong

But the Goldman Sachs settlement (a headline settlement amount of $5.06 billion) for what the Justice Department calls "serious misconduct," provides some real insight into the artful approach taken to mortgage sampling for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).

Imagine you wanted to get an idea of the quality of teachers at a school you're considering for your kids.  The school chooses a sample of 100 teachers, removes the 90 worst ones, and presents to you the 10 most credible, as if they were randomly selected to fairly represent the whole group of teachers.

Well that's pretty much what several of the big banks did.  They sampled the mortgage loans under consideration for inclusion in RMBS transactions.  They kicked out some (or perhaps all) of the non-compliant ones in the sample, and then they presented the cleaned-sample as if it represented the entire pool.  

Among the problems was that the samples were not very big.  So if half of the loans are non-complaint (say 50 out of 100), and you sample only ten percent (say 10 out of a 100) ... and then you kick out 5 from those 10, well, there are still 45 non-compliant loans (half of the unsampled 90 loans) going into the pool!

We wrote about this revelation/absurdity back in 2011, just after the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission released documents showing this incredible pattern.  (You can read our report here, or below.)

The language in Monday's Statement of Facts is additive, and confirms some of the worst suspicions that come from documents provide by Clayton to the FCIC.  Here are some choice snippets: 
"Even when the percentage of loans graded as EV3s and dropped by Goldman from the due diligence samples indicated that the unsampled portions of the pools likely contained additional loans with credit exceptions, Goldman typically did not increase the size of the sample or review the unsampled portions of the pools to identify and eliminate any additional loans with credit exceptions."
"The Mortgage Capital Committee also asked “How do we know that we caught everything?” In response to that question, the Goldman due diligence employee who oversaw the due diligence for one pool of loans purchased from SunTrust Mortgage wrote “we don’t[,] it was sampled w[ith] max at 20%- the drops were a result of timing not systemic issues with SunTrust.” Another Goldman due diligence employee who oversaw the review of a pool of Countrywide loans that Goldman had purchased on March 29, 2006 responded to the same question: “Depends on what you mean by everything? Because of the limited sampling on CW 10-15% we don’t catch everything and the way they [Countrywide] deliver the files we have little chance to upsize. This trade had issues with aged loans and we tried to get pay histories and were told they would not provide them.” In response to the Mortgage Capital Committee’s question “Are these results systemic,” the same employee wrote: “Every trade varies, but typically CW have a very high credit 3 drops on the first review of DD 60% and then clear the docs, so one can assume that the files we are not reviewing would have the same issues.”"
"In April 2006, the Mortgage Capital Committee received a memorandum with a highlevel summary of Goldman’s due diligence results in connection with a proposed Alt-A RMBS offering. The memorandum included aggregate due diligence results for three Countrywide loan pools that Goldman had purchased on March 30, 2006 and indicated that 34.38 percent of the loans in the proposed offering had been drawn from certain of those Countrywide loan pools. The memorandum reflected that Goldman had conducted credit and compliance due diligence on a total of 15.44 percent of the loans in the three March 30 Countrywide pools. ... The memorandum also stated that Goldman had dropped a total of 6.07 percent of the loans in the three Countrywide pools (not the samples) for credit or compliance reasons. Across the three Countrywide pools, Goldman dropped nearly 40 percent of the loans in the credit and compliance due diligence samples for credit and compliance reasons. The memorandum referred to this as an “exceptional drop amount” and stated that “in the case of [Countrywide], an unusually high drop rate for missing or deficient documents resulted in an above average total drop percentage (approximately 33% of the credit drops were due to missing appraisals).” Contemporaneous records reflect that Goldman closed on six Countrywide loan pools on March 29 and 30, 2006, and that Countrywide was struggling with staffing and workload issues that affected its ability to deliver missing documents requested by Goldman for the loans in those six pools."
"Although Goldman dropped 25 percent of the loans in the due diligence sample because they were graded as EV3s, including all the loans graded as EV3s for unreasonable stated income, which comprised at least 2.5 percent of the loans in the due diligence sample, Goldman did not review the portion of the pool not sampled for credit or compliance due diligence, which comprised approximately 70 percent of the total pool, to determine whether there were similar exceptions in the unsampled portion. Goldman subsequently securitized thousands of loans from this pool into one GSAMP transaction. The Mortgage Capital Committee approved the issuance of this offering."

Our report from 2011 can be viewed here:


For an update on the current status of alleged benchmark-rigging antitrust cases, see Alison Frankel's blog, here.

Thursday, March 31, 2016

Ratings Arbitunities — A Tale of 5 Bonds

Moody's, Fitch, S&P and all often get bundled together under the same umbrella as "credit rating agencies," and it's quite possible that we're among those guilty of treating them as if they're all pretty much alike.

Of course, each rating agency is different, and even within each rating agency, arguments can be made that across different departments or product types, their ratings don't exactly mean the same thing.  So, naturally, different rating agencies might well rate things differently.

Moreover, each rating agency has its own (different) ratings scale.  And applying a similar result to different scales can mean that one rating agency's BB may be another's BB+.  Or might the differences be much larger yet?

We've investigated thousands of seasoned RMBS securities, issued pre-crisis, and our findings were ... interesting.  

Below, we're going to show some bonds for which three credit rating agencies have different opinions.  Err, very different opinions.  For some traders and risk-managers, large ratings differentials can create real money-making opportunities, even if it's just by way of risk-allocation or strategic re-allocation benefits. Importantly, in the world of OTC debt instruments, ratings arbitrages don't exactly disappear overnight.  They can exist for ... years.

We hope you enjoy some of the following: current ratings of the same bonds, per 3 different rating agencies.  Screenshots are courtesy of Bloomberg LP.  






Tuesday, July 7, 2015

Disclosure, or What You Will

Seven years after the demise of Lehman Brothers, lawsuits on related financial products are heating up, with a number of RMBS and CDO cases seeing reversals of fortune. 

But first, some background. 

This may seem odd – but so far most of the arguments have had little to do with whether the defendants did anything wrong.[1]  

Rather, the focus has been on peripheral issues, like: (1) jurisdiction; (2) whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue; (3) whether the plaintiffs sued within the permissible time frame; (4) whether the defendants were indeed obligated to fulfill any of the duties they are accused of violating; and (5) whether the investment risks were appropriately disclosed. 

Recent rulings have focused on this final element, and have been rendered in a way largely favorable to the plaintiffs. This is the focal point of today’s post. 


Disclosures and Disclosures – Five Shades of Grey 

Disclosures are subjective issues; they are forms of art. And, most importantly, they are not Boolean – they are not simply present or absent. 

There are various shades of grey. Consider for example the following possible disclosures regarding a bridge: 
  1. Cross bridge at your own risk 
  2. We have performed one or more tests and happen to believe that this bridge is particularly risky, or more risky than other bridges 
  3. This bridge fails to satisfy the criteria set for bridges by the relevant architectural/building standards and safety boards 
  4. We built this bridge and know that it suffers from certain structural flaws 
  5. This may look like a bridge, but it is made of straw and has simply been dressed up to look like a bridge. Do not cross! 



These disclosures differ greatly, and one cannot reasonably argue that all provide the same informational content. 

Of course, it may be okay to sell a distressed asset or a structurally flawed house, as long as its known shortcomings are appropriately disclosed; but when a particular risk is known to one party (often the seller) we argue that the material information needs to be properly disclosed. 

For our purposes, it may be helpful to break disclosures down into three broad categories: 
  1. Those that are general (non-specific) and describe overall risk
  2. Those that describe particular risk(s)
  3. Those that describe the advanced knowledge that one party to an agreement has (over the other) pertaining to particular risk(s) 


Reliance – A Practitioner’s Perspective[2] 

The recent rulings, which we’ll get to in a moment, give us some confidence that the legal system is supporting the essence of what investing in the US financial markets is all about. 

The defenses that “it was disclosed that the investment contained risk” or that “we warned the investor to perform his own due diligence” seem to us to be off-point and insufficient. 

From a practitioner’s perspective, it should be noted that investors are just about always warned that investments contain risks. Of course they do – there’s seldom a reason to invest without the expectation of a positive return[3], and risk and return go hand in hand. And due diligence can often be impractical or prohibitively expensive, and even if it can be performed it may not uncover the true nature of hidden risks, especially if they are known only to certain insiders. 

But in this “trust -but-verify” bargain, is the “trust” element still there? 

Let’s suppose that due diligence could be performed. Should investors have to check everything – every piece of data represented to them to be true and accurate, every potential conflict disclosed or undisclosed, every legal opinion upon which the transaction’s solidity is based, and every accounting record? What is the purpose of a representation or warranty, if the onus remains on the person accepting the representation or warranty? 

In short, shouldn’t investors be allowed to rely on some things? 

Buying a new car encourages some level of diligence too – one may want to take it for a test-drive. But is it healthy to expect or require each car buyer to have advanced engineering or mechanical skills and to test each part for herself? 

We argue it isn’t: such due diligence, while commendable, defeats the purpose. When buying a new car, a purchaser ought to be able to rest easy, relying on her property rights and on the manufacturer’s name and representations, and fairly assume that the parts used are new, in working order, and are expected (certainly by the manufacturer) to last. 

Similarly, when buying a financial product that has been structured by a bank, it would promote market efficiency and be most expedient if investors were able to freely rely on representations and warranties made to them by the banks about the collateral supporting the product. And when a representation turns out to have been faulty, investors could then expect to have recourse through the court system – one of the very reasons overseas investors invest in US-based financial products! 


Decisions, Decisions… 

On the RMBS/CDO side, a recent lower court ruling and a slew of higher court rulings have ended favorably for plaintiffs, finding that the disclosures and disclaimers[4]  provided were not specific enough – reversing decisions made by lower courts that those disclosures had been sufficiently specific. 

Various groups of defendants, in different litigation matters, had regularly made the argument that they had disclosed that some of the thousands of loans that made their way into the mortgage pool may fail to comply with the representations and warranties made of them. Well that’s fair enough – there may have been a data error here or there that is yet to be discovered. 

But at the time of writing this disclosure that “some” loans “may” fail, the truth was very different. Often some loans were already failing (and known to have been failing) to meet one or more of the criteria needed to pass. Moreover, and importantly, it was even the expectation of some defendants at that time that several other loans would imminently be found to fail too. 

In other words, several defendants made the weakest possible disclosure: that something may possibly happen. Meanwhile, defendants often already knew that it was happening, and often en masse. Disclosing that a violation may occur is different from disclosing (1) that violations are known to be occurring, or (2) that the procedures employed leave ample room for the occurrence of violations (and so forthcoming violations should be expected).[5] 

As it happens, in some cases defendants had set up tests to identify noncompliance in loans sampled within the pool. When they found that a high percentage of the sampled loans failed to comply with the representations and warranties, they failed to re-examine the non-sampled loans, but waived them into the securitization trusts anyway. Thus, they knew, or should have known, that a high percentage of the non-sampled loans would fail to meet the criteria upon which they were being purchased into the trusts. In FHFA v Nomura, the court examined the true nature of the mortgage loans being waived into the trust as conforming collateral: 
"Measured conservatively, the deviations from originators’ guidelines made anywhere from 45% to 59% of the loans in each [supporting loan group] materially defective, with underwriting defects that substantially increased the credit risk of the loan."[6] 

Some Examples – Decisions Favorable to Plaintiffs 

     Basis Yield v Goldman (CDO) [7]

The First Department decided that the disclosures were “boilerplate statements” that failed to put the investors on notice of the nature of the risks inherent in the investment (as alleged by the plaintiffs) [8]. The court held that if “plaintiff's allegations are accepted as true, there is a ‘vast gap’ between the speculative picture Goldman presented to investors and the events Goldman knew had already occurred.”[9]  

     ACA v Goldman (CDO) 

In May 2015, the New York Court of Appeals – the state’s highest court – reversed an order by the Appellate Division, holding that “plaintiff here claims that defendant knew that [co-defendant] Paulson was taking a position contrary to plaintiff's interest, but withheld that information, despite plaintiff's inquiries.”[10] 

     FHFA v Nomura (RMBS) 

In this bench trial, the court honed in on the direct issue at hand, ruling in favor of the plaintiff: 
“This case is complex from almost any angle, but at its core there is a single, simple question. Did defendants accurately describe the home mortgages in the Offering Documents for the securities they sold that were backed by those mortgages?”[11] 
     Basis Yield v Morgan Stanley (CDO) 

The court leaned heavily on several prior rulings[12] of the First Department which had recently rejected most of the contentions raised by Morgan Stanley, similar to those advanced in the same court. 

In the court’s words, “The First Department held that New York law is ‘abundantly clear’ that ‘a buyer’s disclaimer of reliance cannot preclude a claim of justifiable reliance on the seller’s misrepresentations or omissions unless (1) the disclaimer is made sufficiently specific to the particular type of fact misrepresented or undisclosed; and (2) the alleged misrepresentations or omissions did not concern facts peculiarly within the seller’s knowledge.” 

In denying Morgan Stanley’s motion to dismiss, the court held that, assuming plaintiff’s allegations to be true, the disclosures “did not apprise investors that Morgan Stanley had deliberately sabotaged assets in the CDO to profit from its short positions.”[13] 


Some Examples – Decisions Favorable to Defendants 

     HSH Nordbank v UBS AG (RMBS) 

HSH Nordbank is one example of an RMBS ruling that went the way of defendants. 

The court ruled that “Here, the core subject of the complained-of representations was the reliability of the credit ratings used to define the permissible composition of the reference pool. The reliability of those ratings was the premise on which the entire deal was sold to HSH. Far from being peculiarly within UBS's knowledge, the reliability of the credit ratings could be tested against the public market's valuation of rated securities.” 

In other words, plaintiff HSH could reasonably have uncovered that the ratings were misrepresented had HSH exercised the necessary due diligence.[14] 

     Lanier v BATS (HFT) 

Lanier, a case concerning high-frequency trading (or HFT), presents a more recent set-back for plaintiffs. 

Lanier’s argument, to a degree, is this: Lanier paid for time-sensitive trading information from NASDAQ; NASDAQ has other clients who paid more, and so they got this time-sensitive information before Lanier did, rendering the information stale and inaccurate by the time it arrived at Lanier’s desk. Lanier argues that he was not appropriately informed that he was being trumped – and that the spirit of the agreement was that nobody would get information before him. 

To use the court’s words, Lanier’s argument is that “when defendants make market data available to preferred data customers more quickly than other customers, they violate Regulation NMS, which is incorporated by reference into contracts between plaintiff Lanier and defendants.” In his words, he seeks “redress for a violation of a contractual commitment prohibiting defendants from providing earlier access to market data to Preferred Data Customers” and as a result, the sale of stale data to him. 

In Lanier’s words, “The Preferred Data Customers are then able to cancel orders and execute trades before Subscribers [like Lanier] even receive the market data.” 

But the court sympathized with the provision of what seems to us to be an extraordinarily weak form of disclosure. The court viewed the following paragraph in the subscription agreement to have been, in the court’s words, “pertinent.” 
“Neither NYSE, any Authorizing SRO nor the Processor (the “disseminating parties”) guarantees the timeliness, sequence, accuracy, or completeness of Market Data or other market information or messages disseminated by any disseminating party. No disseminating party shall be liable in any way to Subscriber or to any other person for (a) any inaccuracy, error or delay in, or omission of, (i) any such data, information, or message, or (ii) the transmission or delivery of any such data, information or message, or (b) any loss or damage arising from or occasioned by (i) any such inaccuracy, error, delay or omission, [or] (ii) non-performance . . . .” (emphasis added by the court) [15]
The court also took particular comfort in the provision within the Nasdaq Subscriber Agreement of a disclosure that reads “STOCK QUOTES MIGHT NOT BE CURRENT OR ACCURATE” and grants the motion to dismiss, preventing any further discovery.[16] 

 Indeed Nasdaq warranted to Lanier that it would “endeavor to offer the Information as promptly and accurately as is reasonably practicable.” If we take plaintiff’s allegations to be true, as we must at the motion to dismiss stage, then clearly NASDAQ did not provide it to Lanier as promptly as reasonably practicable, and it knew it wasn’t doing so. 

The court asserted that Lanier’s “argument misreads the Subscriber Agreements, which promise one thing: the provision of consolidated market data to Lanier and other subscribers like him. The contracts do not prohibit provision of the same data in different forms to different kinds of customers, whether in consolidated or unconsolidated form. And in general the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action separate from a breach of contract claim, as “breach of that duty is merely a breach of the underlying contract.” 

Sadly, in rendering its opinion the court ignores the spirit of the agreement – the intent – and probably the content too. 


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FOOTNOTES

[1] For example, in a bench trial (FHFA v Nomura), the court noted that no real defense was presented as to the inappropriateness of defendants’ actions. “Today, defendants do not defend the underwriting practices of their originators. They did not seek at trial to show that the loans within the SLGs were actually underwritten in compliance with their originators’ guidelines. At summation, defense counsel essentially argued that everyone understood back in 2005 to 2007 that the loans were lousy and had not been properly underwritten.” Opinion at page 267. 

[2] Our goal here is to share a practitioner’s perspective. We do not provide advice of any kind –certainly not legal advice. 

[3] As scientists we must disclose our awareness of several situations in which investments are made without the expectation of a directly positive return, above 0%. While such examples exist, they are in the great minority of investments. For example, 5-year Swiss government bonds currently yield negative 0.539%, and there do exist rational arguments for investing in a negative yielding instrument, including for lack of available alternatives.) 

[4] Hereafter, we will use the short-hand “disclosures” to describe both disclosures and disclaimers. 

[5] An argument could be made that disclosure is faulty when it describes an occurrence as a remote possibility, when it’s known to be likely or inevitable – akin to a form of false advertising. Such disclosure disguises the true nature of the possibility. 

[6] Opinion at page 171 

[7] First Department decision and opinion at page 9 (1/30/2014) 

[8] In the court’s words “These disclaimers and disclosures, in our view, fall well short of tracking the particular misrepresentations and omissions alleged by plaintiff.” 

[9] A similar finding was made by the First Department in Loreley v Citigroup

[10] ACA Financial Guaranty Corp., Appellant, v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., Respondent, Paulson & Co., Inc. et al., NY INDEX NO. 650027/2011; Court of Appeals, No. 49, at page 4 (5/7/2015). Importantly, the court notes that ACA’s case differs from a prior case, in which the plaintiffs "knew that defendants had not supplied them with the financial information to which they were entitled, triggering 'a heightened degree of diligence.'" (Pappas v Tzolis, 20 NY3d 228, 232-233 [2012], quoting Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. 17 NY3d at 279). 

[11] Opinion and order at page 7

[12] Specifically, Loreley v Citigroup; Loreley v Merrill Lynch; Basis Yield v Goldman; and CDIB v Morgan Stanley 

[13] For example, the court specifically notes that the disclosure that Morgan Stanley would be acting in ‘its own commercial interest’ was … insufficient to put the Fund on notice of Morgan Stanley’s intent to offload low-rated RMBS from its books.” 

[14] For what it’s worth, our opinion is that it is impractical to have to second guess every party to a transaction; and having tried to, we can argue that it is very difficult if not impossible for a non-rating agency expert (and possibly even for a ratings expert) to effectively reverse-engineer ratings agencies’ complex models – which are often black-boxes, driven by and reliant on internal assumptions that cannot be seen by the most sophisticated of users. Having said that, the court raised its concern that, according to its reading of the amended complaint, HSH may not have provided sufficient factual information to support such the allegation, in the court’s words, “that the credit rating conferred on a security by a rating agency did not necessarily correspond to the security's risk level as perceived by the market.” 

[15] Ruling at page 26

[16] Here we have the same issue: Does disclosing the potential for delays in data distribution appropriately notify the subscriber that the data provided to him was always or regularly or intentionally being delayed? Aside from the omissions complained of, this disclosure, itself seems untruthful. Is it not misleading to state that “a quote might not be current,” when knowing that it is not current? If one wanted to be honest, one would disclose: “quotes are not current – beware!” 

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CASE CAPTIONS (links can be clicked to download opinions)

ACA v Goldman: ACA Financial Guaranty Corp., Appellant, v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., Respondent, Paulson & Co., Inc. et al., NY INDEX NO. 650027/2011 

Basis Yield v Goldman: Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., NY INDEX NO. 652996/2011; 2014 NY Slip Op 00587 

Basis Yield v Morgan Stanley: Basis Yield Alpha Fund Master v Morgan Stanley, NY INDEX NO. 652129/2012 

CDIB v Morgan Stanley: China Development Industrial Bank v Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated et al, NY INDEX NO. 650957/2010 

FHFA v Nomura: Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) v Nomura Holding America, Inc., et al, 11-cv-06201-DLC 

HSH Nordbank: HSH Nordbank AG v UBS AG et al, 2012 NY Slip Op 02276 

Lanier v BATS: HAROLD R. LANIER, on behalf of himself individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v BATS Exchange, Inc. et al, 14-cv-03865-KBF 

Loreley v Citigroup: Loreley Financing (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd., et al v Citigroup Global Markets Inc., et al, NY INDEX NO. 650212/2012; 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 03358 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) 

Loreley v Merrill Lynch: Loreley Financing (Jersey) No. 28, Limited v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, et al., NY INDEX NO. 652732/2011; 2014 NY Slip Op 03326 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) 


DISCLAIMER:  This blog has been posted for informational purposes only.  PF2 does not provide advice of any kind.

Wednesday, October 22, 2014

Ocwen Letter Spooks the Market

Ocwen just can't seem to get a break.

After a rough first 9 months to the year -- stock was down 53.5% YTD as of Monday's close -- the release of NY State Fin. Dept. Superintendent Benjamin Lawsky's letter to Ocwen's general counsel sent the stock tumbling again. 

Our last coverage was back in February, after Ocwen had agreed to a settlement fee, with the CFPB, of $2.2 billion, for its missteps from 2009-2012.  We showed the potential for this litigation expense to grow, as there were even more complaints in 2013 against Ocwen than in 2012.

The stock is now down 24.8% from Monday's close: Lawsky's letter included some powerful language, some of which could have repercussions to Ocwen beyond the immediate scope of the letter.


Lawsky's previous letter to Ocwen, dated April 2014, brought to the fore what Lawsky's office saw to be a "particularly troubling issue" - "the relationship between Ocwen and Altisource Portfolio’s subsidiary, Hubzu, which Ocwen uses as its principal online auction site for the sale of its borrowers’ homes facing foreclosure, as well as investor-owned properties following foreclosure." 
Hubzu appears to be charging auction fees on Ocwen-serviced properties that are up to three times the fees charged to non-Ocwen customers. In other words, when Ocwen selects its affiliate Hubzu to host foreclosure or short sale auctions on behalf of mortgage investors and borrowers, the Hubzu auction fee is 4.5%; when Hubzu is competing for auction business on the open market, its fee is as low as 1.5%. These higher fees, of course, ultimately get passed on to the investors and struggling borrowers who are typically trying to mitigate their losses and are not involved in the selection of Hubzu as the host site.
In August, Moody's downgraded Ocwen's primary servicer and special servicer ratings - and left both assessments on watch for further downgrade.  The shareholder class action complaints started to trickle in in August, and by September 2014 a handful of shareholder complaints had been filed.  (See for example NORBERT TUSEO, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. OCWEN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, RONALD M. FARIS, JOHN V. BRITTI and WILLIAM C. ERBEY)

The recent information about Ocwen's potentially backdating thousands of foreclosure documents is relevant not just insofar as it affects the nature of all current shareholder litigation, but insofar as Ocwen is being sued by mortgage borrowers, directly, and by mortgage market players and investors.  Crucially, Ocwen's servicing performance can be critical to the performance of RMBS securities.

For example, at least five third-party complaints have recently been filed by Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc. against, among other co-defendants, Ocwen as the servicer of the RMBS trusts. The complaints argue that Ocwen's underperformance has harmed the plaintiff, or that the breaches ought alternatively to relieve Nomura of certain of its duties to the trust.  The following excerpt comes from Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc. v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, filed 8/11/14.


This public embarrassment can make it more difficult for Ocwen to defend itself in the existing and future litigation as it will inevitable have suffered a deterioration in reputation capital.  Last but not least, it will likely further hinder any near-term hopes Ocwen may have had of buying additional mortgage servicing rights (MSRs), and expanding its business.

Friday, December 20, 2013

Richmond's Eminent Domain Program: It Could Really Happen

Richmond, California’s plan to use eminent domain to free city homeowners from underwater mortgages took a number of steps forward recently. Until this month, I would have given very long odds against Richmond actually going ahead with the plan, but now I would place the chances at close to 50/50.

The first development occurred last week in Washington with the Senate’s confirmation of Melvin Watt as Director of the Federal Home Finance Agency – which regulates Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.  Under Acting Director Ed DeMarco, the agency had suggested it might prevent GSE financing in Richmond if the city moved forward with its plan to seize properties under the guise of eminent domain. The threat of not being able to get a Fannie or Freddie insured mortgage would have inflamed local opposition to the program. But, given Watt’s more progressive orientation, I doubt that he will continue DeMarco’s resistance. I suspect Watt is much more likely to look at the situation through the “little people vs. big banks” lens than his predecessor – whose career was devoted to the health of the home financing market.

The other developments occurred Tuesday night at the City Council meeting, the video of which is available here (most of the relevant discussion can be found between the 3 hour and 6 hour marks).  Mayor Gayle McLaughlin proposed and won passage of a motion that fine-tuned the program in a couple of important ways.

First, her measure imposed guidelines limiting the eminent domain program to mortgages below the conforming loan limit (now $729,750) and in struggling neighborhoods. This change addresses a revelation first made here at ExpectedLoss and later picked up in a WSJ blog and by the San Francisco Chronicle: that the program would have benefitted owners of some very expensive properties in affluent neighborhoods.

Second, the McLaughlin proposal calls for the eminent domain power to be exercised by a “Joint Powers Authority” rather than by the city itself. As reported by the Chronicle’s Carolyn Said, this change allows the eminent domain action to be approved by only a simple majority vote – rather than a super-majority as previously required. There appear to now be three solid “no” votes out of the seven officials who vote on the Council, so the need for a super majority appeared to be a deal breaker.  McLaughlin should be able to hold onto the four votes necessary to create the JPA and implement the eminent domain program. 

But the JPA device imposes a new challenge: another city would have to agree to participate in the JPA. Although McLaughlin and her supporters listed a number of potential partners in California and elsewhere, none of these cities have gone as far down the eminent domain path as has Richmond. Indeed, it is possible that none of these cities will ever get beyond the talking stage. This assessment applies especially to San Francisco – a city whose skyrocketing home prices have left few mortgages underwater.

A more likely candidate, El Monte, will need to be careful. The city declared a fiscal emergency in 2012 and some of its bonds carry non-investment grade ratings. Richmond has already been punished by the municipal bond market despite its superior fundamentals; it’s hard to see how a lesser credit like El Monte will attract investors if it goes ahead with eminent domain.

So the need to get a partner is a significant barrier – but not an insurmountable one. Undoubtedly, the ambitious folks at Mortgage Resolution Partners are very hard at work finding Richmond a mate. Of course, the path to finally condemning mortgages leads through the courthouse. Whether Richmond can prevail, with a very unusual interpretation of the takings clause, against a battalion of well-financed Wall Street lawyers is another bet entirely.

Wednesday, November 20, 2013

The JPMorgan Settlement

Following on from our prior RMBS litigation coverage (FHFA RMBS Litigation Totals and A Proliferating "Putback" Problemo) we wanted to add some color to the recent $13bn settlement by JPMorgan.

Initial settlement details:
  1. JPMorgan may not pursue indemnification claims from the FDIC for any matters covered by the settlement. 
  2. Included in the settlement is the $4 billion FHFA settlement regarding private-label RMBS losses ($1.26 billion to Fannie Mae; $2.74 billion to Freddie Mac). 
  3. Previously mentioned $680mm and $480mm rep & warranty settlements with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, respectively, are not included in this agreement. (This leaves open the possibility for JPM to claim that the FDIC is responsible for WaMu originations in the rep & warranty settlement.) This could impact the net result of Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. et al. 
  4. Criminal probe is not closed. 
  5. Acknowledgment of misrepresentation, but no explicit admission of wrongdoing.
Our additions are in blue within the table. Sources are at the end.


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http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/November/13-ag-1237.html http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/25649/FHFAJPMorganSettlementAgreement.pdf http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/61620131119191331856335.pdf http://www.ncua.gov/News/Pages/NW20131119JPMorganChase.aspx http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/72420131119202254491668.pdf http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2013/pr13103.html http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/51720131119202421482972.pdf 
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-announces-300-million-settlement-jp-morgan http://www.businesswire.com/news/sacbee/20131119006821/en http://news.delaware.gov/2013/11/19/biden-secures-nearly-20-million-for-delaware/ 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20131119/BLOGS02/131119738/illinois-pension-funds-get-100-million-in-chase-settlement# 
 http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2013/2013-11-19-jpmorgan-settlement.html http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-led-state-federal-working-group-announces-13-billion-settlement http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/64420131119164759163425.pdf