Anatomy of a Recovery

A quick update on the rock star world of corporate loans after a bumper first three quarters of 2009…

Leveraged loans have now rallied for 9 consecutive months on the back of a perceived general economic recovery – or lower probability of total collapse - and the heightened availability of refinancing and loan modification options for the borrowers.

Having been battered throughout 2008, the first quarter of '09 kicked off with the recovery of the higher quality leveraged loans (generally the BBs). Since then, it’s all been about the lower quality loans (the single Bs and the CCCs) whose performance now far exceeds that of the BBs for 2009:
- the BBs, Bs, and CCCs have year-to-date total returns of 34.2%, 55.0% and 76.4% respectively, according to S&P’s LCD Loan Index as of October 9.

A second change in dynamics has been the evolution of loan refinancings, a trend we’ll continue to watch as a ton of loans are set to mature in the coming three years. Whereas in Q1 ’09 we saw borrowers trying to raise capital to buy back maturing loans, they’re now increasingly seeking to extend the maturities of those loans, often in exchange for a minor amendment fee and an increased spread on the loan or facility. (You can read more about the “amend-to-extend” pattern here.)

While loan covenant relief has staved off certain impending defaults, the rating agencies generally see default rates continuing to rise from their current peaks around 10% for these speculative-grade issuers, tailoring off towards year end or at latest mid-2010. (Note that while refinancing opportunities – in particular debt extension – are typically a net positive for both the borrower and the lender, it does little from the rating agency’s perspective, as they focus on the borrower's ability to meet its net outstanding debt payments, irrespective of their form.)

Moving into 2010 and 2011, growth and recovery remain key for this asset class: covenant amendments, while decreasing short-term default probability, often also restrict borrower purchases in exchange for allowing lower coverage ratios. Lower coverage ratios augur poorly for eventual defaults, if and when they do happen; and the purchasing restrictions, coupled with the more expensive debt coupon, may stymie growth potential.